Know what is on your site before a plaintiff’s firm does.Free website scanScan Your Site
Log in Sign up Book a demo
Home› Editorial› The 2022 CISA Telecom Report That Warned of…
DATA

The 2022 CISA Telecom Report That Warned of “Perilous and Untenable” Risks Before Salt Typhoon

Two years before Salt Typhoon became shorthand for the worst telecom espionage campaign in U.S.

Nov 20, 2026 8 min read

Know what’s on your site before a plaintiff’s firm does

A free privacy audit shows which cookies, pixels and trackers are running — and which ones commonly appear in privacy claims.

Get My Free Audit

Two years before Salt Typhoon became shorthand for the worst telecom espionage campaign in U.S. history, a report written for the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency warned that America’s phone networks “can be readily compromised from anywhere in the world.” The June 2022 report, prepared by the mobile security firm AdaptiveMobile Security with Telecom Defense, described a “perilous and untenable situation” and urged a shift to zero-trust controls across the sector. It stayed out of public view until November 19, 2026, when the Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) published a redacted copy obtained through a Freedom of Information Act lawsuit. The document is a useful case study in how known risks go unaddressed, and it carries practical lessons for any organization that depends on carrier networks to move sensitive data.

TL;DR

  • A June 2022 report prepared for CISA warned of structural weaknesses in U.S. telecom signaling and interconnect networks and recommended a zero-trust approach.
  • CISA withheld the unclassified report in full under a FOIA exemption until EPIC sued, and released a redacted version on November 19, 2026.
  • U.S. agencies say Salt Typhoon, disclosed in 2024, mainly compromised network routers and stole call records and some communications, so the report flagged the sector’s fragility rather than the exact techniques later used.

Cinematic photo of an empty telecom switching hall at night, rows of server racks lit by blue status lights, with one cabinet door left ajar and a thin red light spilling across the floor

What the report is, and what it is not

Some early coverage described the document as “recently declassified.” That framing is inaccurate. The report was never classified. Its cover marks it “UNCLASSIFIED // FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY,” restricts sharing under the Traffic Light Protocol (TLP:AMBER+STRICT) and labels it “Preliminary – Does not represent a coordinated DHS position.” It was prepared for CISA under a contract through the Department of Homeland Security’s Science and Technology Directorate.

The public path to the report was a records fight, not a declassification review. According to EPIC’s account:

  • Fall 2023: CISA let staff for Senator Ron Wyden read the report at its offices but would not release it.
  • February 29, 2024: Wyden wrote to President Biden that CISA was “actively hiding information” about phone-network security and asked for minimum cybersecurity standards for wireless carriers.
  • March 12, 2024: EPIC filed a FOIA request. In November 2024, CISA withheld all 111 pages under FOIA Exemption 5, which covers deliberative material.
  • June 4, 2025: EPIC sued. CISA’s position shifted more than once, including a late-2025 promise to release the report that it later reversed. It finally produced a redacted version after the parties filed pre-motion statements ahead of summary judgment briefing.

One small inconsistency is worth noting. EPIC refers to the document as “U.S. Telecommunications Security 2022,” while the cover of the released copy reads “U.S. Telecommunications Insecurity 2022.” Large portions, including the title of the second recommendation, are redacted under exemptions for deliberative material and law enforcement techniques.

What the 2022 report warned about

The report focuses on signaling and interconnect networks, the plumbing carriers use to route calls and texts and to let customers roam. Its central claims:

  • Old protocols built on trust. Signaling System 7 (SS7), developed in the 1970s, Diameter and GTP-C carry routing and subscriber information between networks. The report calls the trust model behind them “a failed trust.”
  • The U.S. as top target. Based on analysis of up to 50 billion telecom events a day, the authors said the United States “remains the most targeted country in the world” for signaling exploits.
  • Open front doors. International interconnects give malicious actors “relatively ‘trusted’ front-door access,” and compromised domestic carriers, especially small rural ones, could provide unfiltered access. The authors compared U.S. telecom to “a mansion… with unlocked doors and trusting, welcoming tenants.”
  • Breached data as fuel. Stolen subscriber data combined with network access creates “the largest threat vector” for those protecting U.S. communications, the report said, because it can feed commercial spyware and surveillance-for-hire services.
  • Real attacks. It described activity detected on a major U.S. operator between March and May 2022, including attempts to covertly obtain the real-time locations of targeted subscribers.

Its first recommendation, “Dynamic Zero-Trust Protection,” applies the NIST principle of “trust nothing, verify everything” to traffic between carriers. Most of the specific policy measures are redacted, but the visible text points toward scrutiny of foreign ownership, operators using equipment from blacklisted vendors and signaling carriers that route U.S. roaming traffic through facilities abroad. The second recommendation draws an analogy to post-9/11 airline rules, which made airlines responsible for checking that passengers could lawfully travel to the U.S., suggesting carriers and aggregators should bear more responsibility for the traffic they let in.

How it connects to Salt Typhoon

The newsletter summary that brought this story to many readers said Salt Typhoon was able to “exploit the system vulnerabilities” the report described. The record supports a narrower statement.

In November 2024, the FBI and CISA said PRC-affiliated actors had compromised networks at multiple telecom companies, enabling theft of customer call records, compromise of the private communications of “a limited number of individuals” mostly involved in government or politics, and copying of information subject to court-ordered law enforcement requests. A joint advisory from CISA, the NSA, the FBI and international partners in August 2025 said the actors focus on large backbone routers and provider-edge and customer-edge routers, often exploiting publicly known vulnerabilities in network devices, and have operated since at least 2021. U.S. officials have alleged that nine telecom companies were targeted, according to Reuters.

That is a different attack surface from SS7 and Diameter signaling. The 2022 report did not, in the released text, predict router-based intrusions. What it did document was a sector with weak trust controls, fragmented players, “outdated regulation” and “the absence of an effective enforcement capability.” Wyden’s view, quoted by Reuters, is that Congress would have had time to require mandatory standards “in time to prevent the Salt Typhoon hacks” had the report been public. That is an argument about policy, not a finding that the report described the exact flaws Salt Typhoon used.

The regulatory follow-through has been uneven. In January 2025 the FCC issued a declaratory ruling saying CALEA required carriers to secure their networks. On November 20, 2025, the Commission voted 2–1 to rescind it, calling it a misreading of the statute and ineffective, and pointing instead to voluntary industry hardening after Salt Typhoon. Mandatory telecom cybersecurity standards remain a live debate, alongside separate fights over the FCC’s power to fine carriers, including the Supreme Court case on telecom privacy fines.

Governance lessons for organizations that rely on carriers

Few readers run a phone network, but almost every organization depends on one, and the report’s history offers lessons beyond telecom. Here is a practical sequence to work through:

  1. Treat carrier networks as untrusted transport. CISA’s own mobile communications guidance, issued after Salt Typhoon, tells highly targeted people to assume mobile communications may be intercepted and to use end-to-end encrypted messaging. We summarized that advice in our piece on CISA’s mobile security playbook.
  2. Retire SMS for authentication. The same guidance says not to use SMS as a second factor because texts are unencrypted and readable by anyone with access to a provider’s network. Move staff and customers toward phishing-resistant methods such as FIDO security keys or passkeys.
  3. Put carriers in your third-party risk program. Ask telecom and messaging vendors about signaling firewalls, how they monitor interconnect traffic and how quickly they notify customers of incidents. Telecom breaches also drive litigation, as the wave of claims after the AT&T data breach showed.
  4. Minimize what travels over phone channels. Location data, one-time codes and account details sent by text or voice are exactly what signaling attacks harvest. Limit them in customer journeys.
  5. Build an escalation path for unwelcome findings. The 2022 warning sat with officials for years. Make sure internal or commissioned risk reports have owners, deadlines and board visibility, and record decisions to accept risk. A structured approach such as risk mitigation mapping helps keep such findings from stalling.

Regulators outside the U.S. are not waiting for perfect information. Italy’s data protection authority, for example, fined the carrier Wind Tre over security lapses in a case we covered as the telecom sector’s persistent security blind spots. Expect more scrutiny of how telecom providers and their business customers protect data in transit.

Frequently asked questions

Who wrote the report?

The cover says it was prepared for CISA under a contract through DHS Science and Technology by AdaptiveMobile Security Ltd of Dallas, Texas, in conjunction with Telecom Defense of Las Vegas. It is labeled preliminary and not a coordinated DHS position.

Was the report classified?

No. It is marked unclassified, for official use only. CISA withheld it under a FOIA exemption for deliberative material until EPIC’s lawsuit produced a redacted release.

Did the report predict Salt Typhoon?

Not in the released text. It warned of signaling and interconnect weaknesses and lax oversight. Government advisories describe Salt Typhoon as mainly exploiting routers and other network devices.

What are SS7 and Diameter, and are they still used?

They are protocols carriers use to exchange routing and subscriber information, including for roaming. SS7 underpins 2G and 3G networks, and EPIC notes newer systems still interconnect with it, which is why its weaknesses persist.

A warning with a long shelf life

The most striking line in the 2022 report may be its admission that the scale of the exposure was “not yet widely understood.” Four years later, the understanding is there. The question for regulators is whether that turns into enforceable standards. The question for everyone else is simpler: if a known weakness in your own risk register has been sitting unaddressed, this is a good week to move it.

Put this into practice

Turn privacy guidance into working controls.

Captain Compliance helps teams discover tracking technologies, enforce consent, manage privacy requests and document the evidence behind every decision.

Book a demo Run a free scan