The National Institute of Standards and Technology is urging businesses and government agencies to begin replacing encryption systems that could eventually be defeated by quantum computers.
Today’s quantum computers are not powerful or stable enough to break the cryptographic protections used across the internet. However, researchers continue to make advances that could eventually place financial transactions, medical records, intellectual property, government information and other sensitive data at risk.
NIST’s warning is not that conventional encryption will suddenly fail tomorrow. The concern is that replacing cryptographic systems across hardware, software, cloud services and communications networks could take years. Organizations that wait until a sufficiently powerful quantum computer exists may discover that they no longer have enough time to protect their information.
Why Quantum Computers Could Threaten Modern Encryption
Cryptography protects information by using mathematical problems that conventional computers cannot solve efficiently. These algorithms secure data stored on computers, transmitted over the internet and processed through financial, commercial and government systems.
Quantum computers operate differently from conventional computers. Their unusual computational properties could allow sufficiently advanced machines to solve certain mathematical problems that are considered impractical for existing computers.
This gives quantum computing enormous potential in fields such as medicine, materials science and complex modeling. It also creates a serious cybersecurity problem.
A cryptographically relevant quantum computer could potentially break some of the public-key encryption and digital-signature algorithms that organizations currently depend on. If that happens, attackers could gain access to protected communications, impersonate trusted parties or compromise the authenticity of digitally signed information.
The Threat Could Begin Before Quantum Computers Are Ready
Organizations do not need to wait for a powerful quantum computer to exist before addressing the risk.
An attacker can intercept encrypted information today, preserve it and attempt to decrypt it years later when more capable technology becomes available. This strategy is commonly known as “harvest now, decrypt later.”
The threat is particularly important for information that must remain confidential for many years, including:
- Healthcare and medical information.
- Financial and banking records.
- Trade secrets and proprietary research.
- Government and national security information.
- Legal and privileged communications.
- Biometric and identity information.
- Critical infrastructure data.
- Long-term business strategies and transaction records.
Information collected today may still be valuable when quantum decryption capabilities eventually become available. The relevant deadline is therefore not simply the date on which quantum computers can break current encryption. Organizations must also consider the lifespan of their data and the length of time required to replace vulnerable technology.
NIST Has Finalized Post-Quantum Cryptography Standards
To address the threat, NIST has led a multiyear international effort to develop post-quantum cryptography standards.
Post-quantum cryptography uses mathematical approaches designed to resist attacks from both conventional and quantum computers. Unlike quantum communication systems, these algorithms are intended to run on familiar computers, servers, mobile devices and network infrastructure.
NIST finalized three principal post-quantum cryptography standards in 2024 following years of public review and testing:
- ML-KEM, a standard designed to establish shared encryption keys securely.
- ML-DSA, a primary standard for post-quantum digital signatures.
- SLH-DSA, an alternative digital-signature standard based on a different mathematical approach.
The selection process involved researchers and cryptographic experts from around the world. Candidate algorithms were publicly examined for security weaknesses, implementation problems and performance limitations.
Some candidates were eliminated after researchers identified vulnerabilities. That scrutiny was an intended part of the process. Cryptographic standards require sustained analysis before organizations can reasonably trust them to protect high-value systems.
Creating Standards Is Only the Beginning
Finalizing an encryption standard does not immediately protect the systems businesses use.
The standards must be incorporated into network protocols, software libraries, operating systems, web browsers, cloud platforms, hardware, payment systems and commercial applications. Technology providers must then test their implementations and distribute updates to customers.
Organizations must also determine whether older systems can be upgraded or need to be replaced. Compatibility issues may arise when different parties to a transaction adopt new cryptographic technology at different times.
The scale of the transition is one reason NIST considers early preparation essential. Cryptography is embedded throughout modern technology, often in places organizations do not routinely monitor.
Encryption may be used in:
- Websites and online applications.
- Virtual private networks.
- Email and messaging systems.
- Cloud platforms and data storage.
- Digital certificates.
- Identity and access-management systems.
- Payment cards and financial transactions.
- Software updates and code-signing processes.
- Mobile devices and connected products.
- Backups and archived records.
- Third-party APIs and vendor integrations.
An organization cannot migrate effectively if it does not know where cryptography is being used.
Organizations Need a Cryptographic Inventory
NIST recommends that organizations begin by identifying the systems, applications and data that depend on cryptography.
A cryptographic inventory should record the algorithms being used, the systems that use them, the information they protect, the responsible vendors and whether the technology can be upgraded.
The inventory should also identify the organization’s most sensitive and longest-lived information. Data that must remain confidential for decades may require earlier attention because of the harvest-now, decrypt-later threat.
Organizations should consider questions including:
- Which systems use public-key encryption or digital signatures?
- Where are cryptographic keys created, stored and managed?
- Which systems rely on older or unsupported algorithms?
- How long must protected information remain confidential?
- Which vendors control the organization’s encryption technology?
- Can existing products receive post-quantum updates?
- Which systems would be most difficult to replace?
- Do contracts require vendors to support new cryptographic standards?
This inventory provides the foundation for a realistic post-quantum migration plan.
Vendor Readiness Will Be Critical
Most organizations do not implement cryptographic algorithms directly. They depend on software companies, cloud providers, hardware manufacturers, payment processors and other technology vendors.
Post-quantum readiness must therefore become part of vendor management and technology procurement.
Businesses should begin asking providers when they expect to support NIST’s post-quantum standards, which products will receive updates and whether older products will remain supported. Organizations should also determine whether a vendor’s migration will require configuration changes, new hardware or a complete replacement of the service.
Procurement teams can help reduce future exposure by including post-quantum capabilities in purchasing decisions. Long-lived technology acquired today could remain in service after quantum-resistant encryption becomes necessary.
Contracts for new systems should address upgrade responsibilities, interoperability, security updates and access to documentation describing the cryptography being used.
Cryptographic Agility Can Reduce Migration Risk
Organizations should also consider cryptographic agility: the ability to replace an algorithm or cryptographic component without rebuilding an entire system.
Hard-coding a single encryption method into applications can make future transitions expensive and disruptive. Systems designed with cryptographic agility allow organizations to change algorithms as standards evolve or new vulnerabilities emerge.
This matters because post-quantum migration will not necessarily be a one-time replacement. Cryptographic research will continue, implementation weaknesses may be discovered and standards may change.
Organizations should avoid treating the first post-quantum upgrade as the final word on encryption security. The long-term objective should be an adaptable cryptographic environment that can respond to new threats more quickly.
NIST Action Plan for Post-Quantum
Most businesses do not need to replace every cryptographic system immediately. They should, however, begin preparing for a transition that could affect nearly every part of their technology environment.
Practical steps include:
- Inventory cryptographic systems. Identify where encryption, digital signatures, certificates and key-exchange mechanisms are used.
- Classify sensitive information. Determine how long different categories of information must remain confidential.
- Prioritize long-lived data. Give early attention to information that could remain valuable to an attacker for years or decades.
- Assess legacy technology. Identify systems that cannot be updated easily or rely on unsupported encryption.
- Engage technology vendors. Request specific information about post-quantum development and migration plans.
- Update procurement standards. Make post-quantum support and cryptographic agility part of future purchasing decisions.
- Develop a migration roadmap. Establish responsibilities, priorities, dependencies and estimated timelines.
- Test before deployment. Evaluate performance, compatibility and security before moving critical systems to new algorithms.
- Maintain current security updates. Ensure devices and applications receive updates as vendors introduce post-quantum capabilities.
- Document the program. Preserve inventories, risk assessments, vendor responses, testing records and migration decisions.
The Post-Quantum Transition Is a Governance Challenge
Quantum computing is a highly technical field, but preparing for its security implications is not solely an engineering responsibility.
Legal teams must consider confidentiality requirements and contractual commitments. Privacy teams must identify sensitive personal information that requires long-term protection. Procurement teams must evaluate vendor readiness. Executives must determine which systems and data deserve priority. Technology and security teams must ultimately implement and test the migration.
The most significant risk may be organizational delay. A company can recognize the quantum threat in theory while failing to determine which systems are vulnerable, who is responsible or how long replacement will take.
NIST’s post-quantum standards give organizations a starting point. The next step is translating those standards into inventories, procurement requirements, vendor oversight and a documented migration strategy.
No one knows exactly when a cryptographically relevant quantum computer will arrive. Businesses do know, however, that replacing foundational encryption across complex technology environments will take time.
That makes post-quantum preparation a present-day cybersecurity and data-governance responsibility—not a problem that can safely be postponed until quantum computing reaches its next breakthrough.